In this paper, we introduce a model for donation verification. A randomized algorithm is developed to check if the money claimed being received by the collector is (1 − )-approximation to the total amount money contributed by the donors. We also derive some negative results that show it is impossible to verify the donations under some circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
Worldwide billions of dollars are donated for charities. For example, United States alone gave over 335 billion dollars for philanthropy in 2013. When this much money is involved there would also be fraudsters who take advantage of one's generosity. Recognizing fraudulent practices, US Federal Trade Commission has given a number of things to check before giving to charity. The efficiency of a charitable organization is currently determined by the percentage of fund actually end up being used for intended purpose. Charity-Watch [6] concludes 60% or greater spent on charitable programs and the remaining spent on overhead is acceptable. However, currently no algorithms are available to detects errors in reporting of monies donated. Donors merely trust the data provided by the charitable organizations or charts published by organizations such as Charity Navigator [3] . China's Red Cross Society, a national charity organization in China, came under fire about its credibility after the GUO Meimei scandal in 2011. There is a public doubt if China's Red Cross has been using the money, which is collected from many donors, in right purposes. Some research regarding charity donations and their management have been conducted in the academic Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. community ( [7] ; [2] ; [4] ; [1] ; [5] ). We have not seen any existing research about how donors check the amount of money received by the collector. It is essential to develop some algorithm that the donors and charitable organizations use to trust each other.
With the development of charity donations in the modern society, it becomes a more and more important social problem about charity donation system. In addition to establishing related laws, it is also essential to build up efficient auditing systems about charity donations, and apply big data technology to manage them. The progression in this direction will bring efficient and accurate methods for charity donations, which will improve our social reliability.
In this paper we develop a method that would allow us to verify monies received by charitable organizations. It would be difficult for every donor to verify each philanthropic organization. Our method is based on a randomized model thereby reducing the number of verifications. Using our algorithm, even if only a small percentage of the donors participate in the verification process, incorrect data given by the philanthropic organizations (cheating) can be detected. With just few steps a donor can verify if the money is used for intended purpose with a high degree of probability.
MODELS
Assume that there are people who donated money. Let be the amount of money donated by person . In this model, we assume that each person checks his donation with probability 1 − − if he donated amount money, where is fixed. This model means that a person will have larger chance to check his donation if he contributes more money.
We define a donation tree. A donation tree gives a data structure to characterize how a donation collector receives money from many donors. If a donation tree is balance enough, it will have a small depth, which is the longest distance from the root to a leaf. See Figure 1 for example.
Definition 2.1. We define a donation tree. For each leaf in a donation tree, its donation value is defined to be ( ). For node in a tree , define ( ) to be the sum of values (.) in its leaves of the subtree with root at . For each node , function ( ) is the amount money that the collector claims from the donors at the leaves of the subtree with root at . An error path from a leaf to the root has a node with ( )
are the children of in , and ( ) be the vale saved in node .
A donation tree without cheating should be the case ( ) = ( ) for all nodes in the tree. Let be an integer at least 2. A -donation tree is a donation tree such that each internal node has at most children. The money donated from one donor is at a leaf. Each node saves the total money ( ) of leave below it, and a value ( ) ≤ ( ) to represents the amount of money the collector claiming to have received from the leaves. In the case ( ) < ( ), it is considered a cheating from the collector. We have the donation tree without cheating in Figure 2 .
OUTLINE OF OUR METHODS
Our main result is to show it is possible to provide a data structure and efficient way for donation verification under reasonable probabilistic hypothesis. During the verification, we cannot expect every donor to attend it, but we hope cheating with a large amount of money will be detected when a reasonable number of donors attend it.
We assume that all donors are all independent. The probabilistic assumption is that a donor has probability at least 1 − − to attend the verification, where is a fixed parameter, and is the amount money from the donor. This is based on the common sense that the more money a donor contributes, the more likely the donor checks if his contribution has been counted.
The data structure provided for verification is a balanced tree that has a small depth. Multiple donors may attend the verification based on the tree structure provided by the collector. A donor checks his donation, and verify if each node on the path to root holds the sum of money from its children nodes. We show that if ( ) < (1 − ) at root , then with probability at most − , it is not detected, where is the total amount of money actually received by the collector. As each donor who attends the verification only checks the nodes from his leaf node to the root, he only does a small amount of calculation. Under the condition that ( ) < (1 − ) , we show that there are donors 1, · · · , with ∑︀ =1 ( ) ≥ such that each of donors can detect error when checking the path from its leaf node, which holds the money donated from the donor, to the root, which holds the total amount of money received by the collector. For examples, see the two paths → → and → → in Figure 3 . Both paths have node with cheating information. The existence of those donors are based on an induction on the depth of the donation tree.
ALGORITHM AND ITS ANALYSIS
In this section, we develop an algorithm for this problem. Lemma 4.1. For each integer ≥ 2, A -donation tree of nodes can be built in ( ) time offline with depth (log ). It also supports an (log ) time for both insertion and deletion.
Proof. A divide and conquer method can be used to build a donation tree of depth (log ) with ( ) time offline (the input of donations from people are given). If it based on the structure of B+-tree, then it can support (log ) time for both insertion and deletion.
Protocol

Collector:
Generate a file that contains a donation tree. Publish the file . Assume that the root of the donation tree has a value ( ) < ( ). There are leaves 1, · · · , in the tree that all have error paths to root, and ( 1) + · · · + ( ) ≥ ( ) − ( ).
Proof. We prove it by induction. It is trivial when the depth is 0. A tree of depth 0 only has one node, which is the only donor. Assume that the statement is true for the depth at most . Consider the depth + 1. Let be a node of depth + 1 and have children 1, · · · , ℎ . Case 1. ( ) < ( 1) + · · · + ( ℎ ), then every leaf has a error path. Case 2. ( ) ≥ ( 1) + · · · + ( ℎ ). Let 1 , · · · , be all of the nodes of 1, · · · , ℎ such that ( ) < ( ). We have
We note that for each ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ℎ} − { 1, · · · , }, ( ) − ( ) ≤ 0. By induction hypothesis, for each , there are leave ,1, · · · , , under the subtree with root at such that ( ,1) + · · · + ( , ) ≥ ( ) − ( ). Let = { ,1, · · · , , } for = 1, 2, · · · , . Let be the set of all leave ∈ 1 ∪ · · · ∪ , we have ∑︀ 
Random Verification with Exponential Distribution
In this section, we consider the case that donor join the verification by following exponential distribution. The people who donate more money have higher probability to do the verification than the people who donate less money. Theorem 4.3. Assume that a -donation tree is provided with integer ≥ 2 and there are donors. Then the algorithm lets each verify takes ( ℎ) steps, and reports error if it is not an (1 − )approximation in the report with probability at least 1 − , where = − and ℎ is the depth of the tree.
Proof. Let = ( ) where is the root of the -donation tree. Assume that there is at least error ( ( ) − ( ) ≥ ( )). Let 1, 2, · · · , be nodes with error paths to root of the tree, and have ∑︀ =1 ≥ by Lemma 4.2. If one of 1, 2, · · · , checks its path to the root, then an error (or cheating ) can be detected. Therefore, this problem becomes to compute the probability that none of 1, 2, · · · , does his verification.
The probability that none of them checks is at most − 1 · − 2 · · · − ≤ − . Therefore, with probability at least 1 − − , it checks if it is an (1 − )-approximation.
An Implementation with B-Tree
A donation tree can be implemented with a B-tree that supports (log ) time for searching, insertion, and deletion. When an new leave is inserted, we can update all ( ) for node affected in (log ) time. Similarly, When a new leave is deleted, we can update all ( ) for node affected in (log ) time.
Uniform Random Verification
In this section, we consider the case that donor join the verification by following uniform distribution. Proof. Assume that is the total amount of money donated by all the people. If it is not an (1 − )-approximation, then there are at least error paths corresponding to at least = ⌈︀ ⌉︀ donors by Lemma 4.2. With probability at most (1− ) = (1− ) ⌈ ⌉ , none of them will attend the verification. Therefore, with probability at least 1 − (1 − ) ⌈ ⌉ , the error of the report will be detected.
Multiple Verification Regions
In this section, we show the verification in several region. If each person donates amount in the range [ 0, ]. The interval is partitioned into [ 0, 1), [ 1, 2) , · · · , [ −1 , ]. We assume people different region have different probability to participate the verification.
Let be the probability that a person with donation range in verifies. Then there is a verification protocol such that with probability at most ∑︀ −1 =0 (1 − ) /(1+ ) to fail to check 1 − approximation, where is the total amount of donation with each donation in . Furthermore, the verification time is (log + ).
Proof. Use one verification tree for each . Form a tree by linking 1, · · · , −1 as children. It follows from Theorem 4.4.
IMPOSSIBILITIES OF VERIFICATION
In this section, we show that it is impossible to use uniform probability to do donation verification. We also prove that it is impossible to do verification if negative items are allowed. Theorem 5.1. There is no randomized algorithm that can detect the cheating from collector with probability at most if every donor checks his donation with probability at most .
Proof. Let = 9. Imagine the collector receives amount money with from one donor A. He releases a document that includes all the money from the others except A. If A does not verify it, it should be all correct without any error. Therefore, with probability at most , the verification fails.
Theorem 5.2. There is no randomized algorithm that detect the cheating with negative donation allowed from collector with probability at most if one donor checks his donation with probability at most .
Proof. Let the sum of − 2 donors 1, · · · , −2 be equal to . Let the donor − 1 contribute 1 or 0, and donor contribute − . Consider the first case that donor − 1 contributes 1. The total is equal to 1.
Consider the second case that donor − 1 contributes 0. The total is equal to 0. If that donor − 1 takes probability at most to do verification, then we have probability at most to make the difference of the two cases.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we develop a protocol for the donation verification under some probabilistic assumption. It only expects the donors follow certain probabilistic distribution to attend verification, and takes (log ) steps for each donor. Our data structure and algorithm are easy to implement with software due to its simplicity.
